




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174.
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A
DETECTION
OF THE
VIEWS

OF THOSE

Who would, in the present Crisis, engage
an Incumber'd, Trading Nation, as
PRINCIPALS, in a ruinous expensive
LAND-WAR;

In ANSWER to a Pamphlet lately published,

ENTITLED,

The Important Question discuss'd, &c.

*Negligis immeritis nocituram
Postmodo te natis fraudem committere? — HOR.*

L O N D O N :

Printed for L. RAYMOND, and Sold by
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[Price One Shilling.]



A
DETECTION
OF THE
Views of those, &c.



T the first Appearance of this
* Pamphlet, I took it, as I be-
lieve most of its Readers did, to
be wrote by some conceal'd, art-
ful *Jacobite*, who, by raising our Admira-
tion to a new and distant Object, and put-
ting us upon a wrong Scent, was sure to
divert us from seeing our nearer Danger,
or pursuing our genuine Interest. What
other Opinion could be entertained of a
Writer, who with the Solemnity of a *Greek*
or *Roman* Patriot, rings the Alarm of Dan-
gers abroad, whilst he covers over those at
home, and advises his Country to an im-

* *The Important Question discuss'd, &c.*

A 2

mediate

mediate Exertion of her *whole* Strength on the Continent, at the same time that she is forced to import *foreign Troops* to quell violent Commotions within her own Bowels?

* “ Our Troubles, says he, being at length happily driven into a remote Corner of the Island, and our Minds somewhat recovered from the late Alarms, ’tis now Time for the Wisdom of the Nation to consider and determine which Way we are to turn next, and what Measures to pursue for the future.”——
The young Pretender indeed is retired from *Derby*, with a Handful of Men to *Inverness*, where he seems to have so multiplied his Few, that he dares dispute the Field with two Royal Armies at once. A slight Pain only which was lately in the Stomach, being forced out to one of the Limbs, is there turned to a confirm’d Gout; but are we to conclude from thence, that the Patient is out of Danger? May it not rather be dreaded, that the Disease will return with redoubled Force to the noble Parts?

Our Author, persuaded, I suppose, that his Countrymen, against the visible Lights of their Senses, would take his Word that the Rebellion was strangled by his Paper Bow-string, sets out in the very next Page

with advising what Measures to pursue for the future *. These are, “ once more to
 “ cover *Flanders* with our Troops, to ne-
 “ gotiate, to fight, and to expend our Trea-
 “ sures, in restraining the over-grown Pow-
 “ er of *France*, and in preserving the Ba-
 “ lance of Power in *Europe*.”——This Ba-
 lance of Power, surely, must be a most
 precious Gem, which could induce a Tra-
 ding Nation to hunt after it for above half
 a Century, at an Expence of three Hundred
 Millions at least, without rightly compre-
 hending its intrinsic Value, or knowing
 where to find it, or how to fix it.

It was said of the late Dean of *St. Patrick's*, that he was born with Talents pec-
 culiar to himself; or, as a late ingenious
 Writer said of him, that he stood alone,
 neither imitating nor imitable. I confess
 I cannot assent implicitly to what is here
 said of *Dr. Swift*, because it always appear'd
 to me that he not only took many of the
 ancient Writers for his Models, but even
 borrowed from them; which, far from
 being a Reproach to that Great Man, was,
 in my Opinion, highly commendable in
 him. But whether the humorous Dean
 was a Plagiary or not, I am sure my Read-
 ers will agree with me, that the Writer I
 am now considering, stands single in his

Advices, and varies from all that have ever wrote on the Interests and Policies of this Nation.

Before he will allow us to extinguish the Flame in our own Bowels, he advises the kindling of Fires all over the Continent. Before he will permit us to clear *Scotland* of armed Rebels, he advises the fomenting a Rebellion in the Heart of *France*. But for fear his Meaning should be mistaken, in letting the Rebellion here at home take care of itself, he tells us we are to attack *France*, not with Part, but with *all* our Strength.—If this is not being singular, I know not what Writer merits the Epithet.—I can't say, however, but this sort of Singularity is pretty extraordinary, considering our present Circumstances, and present Situation of our Affairs. Methinks he might have spared us some small Portion of our Force, for our own Security here at home. But why should he be more conscionable than his Betters?

* “ In short, the Danger (of the Power
“ of *France*) is now become too great and
“ pressing, as well as *too near us*, (see our
“ Author's Sagacity, in finding out that
“ *Brabant* was nearer than *Scotland*!) to be
“ gazed upon with Indifference, or to be
“ lightly sported with.”—The grand Cri-

* Page 41 and 42.

“ his seems not to be far off, and conse-
 “ quently this is no Time for trying Expe-
 “ riments. Were we to temporize, and
 “ act with *half* our Strength only in this
 “ perilous Conjunction, that half would
 “ most indisputably be thrown away, and
 “ at the Year’s End we should certainly
 “ be found to have exhausted ourselves to
 “ no manner of Purpose.—If then we will
 “ save *Europe*, (one might hope, if this
 Writer had never interfered, that all *Eu-*
rope might be able to deal with a small
 Part of *Europe*) “ if indeed we will save
 “ *England*, as a Free, Trading, and Pro-
 “ testant Country, whatever may be the
 “ Consequence, we must act with our
 “ *whole* Force, both by Sea and Land, both
 “ in *Europe* and *America*.”

It is true the Author, in the above Quo-
 tation, seems to have half an Eye to our
 favourite and natural Element, the *Sea* ;
 but it plainly appears, by what he said im-
 mediately before, that his whole View, his
 whole Scheme was calculated for a Land
 War, and for the carrying on that Land
 War chiefly by our own National Troops.

* “ Suppose then, in order to save the
 “ Nation’s Money, we were to act with
 “ our Fleet only in this Conjunction, how
 “ would this affect the *French* Schemes

“ upon the Continent? Will our Fleet
 “ be able to protect *Luxembourg*, *Antwerp*,
 “ or *Philipsburgh*? Will the whole Royal
 “ Navy of *England* prevent *Turin* from be-
 “ ing besieged and taken?” — This sin-
 gular Author, 'tis true, adds the Word *im-*
possible, immediately after these wise Inter-
 rogatories; but notwithstanding this, I do
 not scruple to dissent from him in this, as
 I do in most of his other Positions. I must
 indeed yield to him, if he will tie me down
 to the literal Sense of these profound Que-
 stions, it being certain that till a Premium
 be voted by Parliament for the Discovery
 of sailing upon dry Land, we can no more
 hope to see our Fleets sail to *Philipsburgh*
 and *Turin*, than the finding the Longitude,
 or North-west Passage.

But with all due Deference to so accu-
 rate a Writer, may not such a Power as
France, which has foreign Plantations, and
 a vast foreign Commerce, whence she draws
 most of her Wealth, and an Extent of Sea-
 Coast of near two Thousand Miles, be so
 impoverished and kept in Awe by a supe-
 rior Naval Force, as to blunt the Keeness
 of her Stomach for Conquests, which she
 may be sure she must restore upon a Peace,
 unless she would stand singly against a Con-
 federacy of all the other Powers of *Europe*?
 Was she in the actual Possession of the three
 impor-

important Fortresses mentioned by the Author, and even of *Breda*, *Mastrich*, and *Nimeguen*, still would an *English* Fleet, if rightly managed, recover them back for the Owners in a very few Weeks, and at a very insignificant Expence of Blood. The Conquest of *Martinico* and *St. Domingo* could not be attended with so many Difficulties and Dangers as that of *Cape-Breton* was. And how fond soever *France* may be of an Enlargement of Territory, she would give up all her late Conquests and more, to have these enriching Plantations restored to her.—But of this more hereafter.

I did not expect indeed, that one who would plunge us into new Difficulties before our domestic Peace was settled, would be contented with an Exertion of our natural Force ; but hoped he might be satisfied with generous Subsidies to such of our Allies upon the Continent, as could be prevailed upon to take our Money in order to secure themselves from the Yoke of *France*, which has given this Writer such dreadful Apprehensions. But this neither won't do ; and which is more unreasonable, the taking foreign Mercenaries into our Pay, to fight the Quarrels of Foreigners, won't please him. In short, nothing less will go down with this Admirer of Heroism, than the scattering *English* Coin, and shedding *Eng-*
B
lish

list Blood on the Banks of the *Scheld*, the *Meuse*, the *Moselle*, and the *Rhine*.

* “ Let us add to our continual and
 “ strongest Efforts by Sea, a few season-
 “ able *Subsidies* to such of our Allies upon
 “ the Continent, as are most in want of
 “ pecuniary Supplies. But even this Mea-
 “ sure, tho’ somewhat more effectual than
 “ the former, would, upon the Experi-
 “ ment, I am afraid, be found not altoge-
 “ ther sufficient to answer the mighty Pur-
 “ poses we should expect from it.” —
 The Reason why our candid Writer objects
 to *Subsidies*, is so very curious and extraor-
 dinary, that it would be a Wrong to both
 him and the Reader, not to give it in his
 own significant Words. They are these †.
 “ For the Money which is voted by Par-
 “ liament for *Subsidies* to foreign Powers,
 “ may be bestowed we know not how ;
 “ some of it may stop at home for prompt
 “ Payment, for Freightage, for the Ex-
 “ pence of returning ; more, if it may fall
 “ to the Share of hungry, indigent Cour-
 “ tiers abroad, or be thrown away in mag-
 “ nificent Shews, Coronations, &c. and
 “ but a small Share of it be left to be ex-
 “ pended according to the original Inten-
 “ tion of the Donors.”

* Page 40. Page *ibid*.

I don't

I don't suppose this Writer designed it; but he very emphatically unravels here all the Mystery of our late Subsidiary Treaties, and accounts very naturally for the little Benefit resulting from the Millions doled away by us for many Years past, in Subsidies to *German* Princes, and particularly for the rapid Successes of *France*, in *Flanders* last Campaign, where a strong Army of *Austrians* might have joined ours, and have obstructed the Career of the Enemy, if the large *Subsidy* granted by Parliament to the Queen of *Hungary*, had not been employ'd in Shews and Coronations at *Frankfort*.

After our Author determines against carrying on the War by Sea only, or by Sea and by Subsidy conjunctively, he condescends that a few Mercenaries be hired to join our National Troops on the Continent. But who does not see what he drives at by this Condescension? Who does not perceive that it is relative to the Troops of a certain cherished Electorate, which not caring for the Burden of ten or twenty Thousand Men, would willingly throw it upon the Pack-horse of *Europe*? * “ But “ what I chiefly insist upon is, that this “ Scheme (of attacking *France* by Sea only, and giving Subsidies to our Allies)

* Page 40.

“ in all Probability would not answer the
 “ Purpose it is intended for; that it would
 “ be neither so advantageous to ourselves,
 “ or our Allies, as employing as many of
 “ our National Troops as might conveni-
 “ ently be spared, and taking a proper
 “ Number of foreign ones into our Pay,
 “ and under our own Direction.”—*Under*
our own Direction! These Words point out
 as evidently the foreign Troops intended to
 be taken into *English* Pay, as if the Word
H—ns had been wrote at full Length.
 ’Tis not doubted but they would be *directed*
 to any Service it should be thought proper
 to put them upon. But be that as it may,
 if they are never *directed* to serve *nearer*
 than the Continent, they shall have the
 good Wishes of all true *Englishmen*.

We are now come down to the principal
 Wheel of his political Machine, which is,
 the sending our National Troops abroad,
 more, I fear, to make *room* for the Merce-
 naries to be hired, than to support the Cause
 of Liberty abroad, or to heap Glories and
 Honours upon his Countrymen. * “ Where-
 “ as, by employing our own Troops in the
 “ Service, whether National or hired, we
 “ have stronger Assurance of the Success
 “ of their Operations, all *Europe* is con-

* Page 41.

“ vinced

“vinced that we are heartily concerned in
 “the common Cause, that we are resolved
 “to stand by our Treaties, and in earnest
 “in Defence of our Allies, &c.”

But of all the Out-doings of our Author, the following Consequence, which he deduces from our employing a large Body of our National Troops on the Continent, is the most curious and most interesting to an *Englishman*, who, as he has a Right to be free, would wish never to see the least Traces of a Standing Army in this Kingdom. * — “And what cannot be too
 “much regarded, we shall by this Means
 “keep equal Pace with our Neighbours in
 “the Art of War, and have an Army of
 “well-disciplined and Veteran Soldiers,
 “with experienced Officers and Generals
 “at their Head, &c.—

I make no doubt, but this Consideration was prevalent with the Author whose Work I am discussing. 'Tis the Business of meer cringing Courtiers, Creatures of Power, and their Dependents, to inculcate Maxims injurious to Liberty, and productive of an Increase of the Prerogative. But as much as it is the Study of Sycophants to compliment Power at the Expence of the People, it ought to be no less that of the latter to

guard against even distant and oblique Attacks upon their Freedom. If then it can be perceived that this present Alarm, which would ring us to a draining, ruinous Land War, before the Rebellion be quell'd, have any Tendency to perpetuating Standing Armies, or introducing foreign Troops among us, I won't doubt but the venal Bell-man, whomsoever he be, will be treated with the Contempt and Scorn he deserves.

Methinks I have now said enough to justify my Suspicion of this Author's Principles, when first I read his Work. I thought it impossible for any Man, untinged with *Jacobitism*, to attempt luring his Country into an Opinion of the Eligibility of a Land War, after so expensive and unsuccessful an Attempt as had been already made for three Years successively, after being obliged to call home not only our National Troops, but foreign Mercenaries for our Protection, and before the Cause was entirely removed which was the Object of bringing over such Armies in the most inclement Season of the Year, and covering the Face of our Land with an idle immoral Generation, whom a Trading People can never enough condemn and abhor.

But upon maturer Reflection, I am satisfied I mistook my Man. Instead of a concealed

cealed *Jacobite*, which I took him for in the Beginning, I am now convinced he is as far from being one, as the Courtier who set him to work. But tho' I absolve the cunning Shaver from *Jacobitism*, I cannot acquit him of *H——nism*, which, should it ever come to *Extreams*, would be no less dangerous than the former. As a secret Enemy is more dangerous than one open and avowed, so may a mere *H——n* be more dangerous to the Constitution of these Nations than the most flagrant *Jacobite*. The Principles of the latter being known, and his Views fixed and determined, his Machinations are soon perceived, and easily defeated. But the Ways of the former are seldom known, his Designs are carefully kept out of View; like the Mole, he often works in the Dark; and like the Rower, constantly turns his Face from the Goal he is journeying to. A cursory Review of the Conduct of our Ministers for some Years past, will best prove the Likeness of this Portrait of a *H——n* Mole.

If the late Mr. *Shippen* had been in the late Lord *Oxford's* Place, we should never have seen the Sanction of Parliament given to a String of Treaties, for which the Treaty-monger ought to have been ——: And why? because Mr. *Shippen's* Principles being known, his Motions would be narrowly

rowly watched, his Actions sifted and scrutinized, and his Measures and Schemes would be opposed and overfet, as tending to pave the Way for the exiled Family. But *Walpole*, being a Whig, a reputed Friend to Liberty, a *quondam* Champion for the Constitution, a *H———n* by inclination, was not only permitted to go on gradually in corrupting the whole People, and sapping the very Foundation of our Freedom, but applauded and supported in all his iniquitous Schemes for impoverishing and enslaving the Subject, and enriching and encreasing the Power of the Crown.

Need I recapitulate the Transactions, foreign and domestic, of the *Walpolean* Administration, which prove that the Minister was much more a *H———n* than an *Englishman*? Need I point out recent Facts in every body's Memory, to prove that he was one of those *H———n's* in *extreme*, whom we have no less Reason to dread than *Jacobites*? Sir *Robert Walpole* was born in *England*, but for all that it may be very evidently proved that he was no *Englishman*. His Successor in Power, had likewise his Birth in *England*; but will any Man, who considers what sort of Heart an *Englishman* should have, reckon him one? Would an *Englishman*, that is, a Man with an *English* Heart, plunge his Country,
 drain'd,

drain'd, tax'd, and incumber'd as she was, into a Land-War, that was and must be injurious to her for ever? And would not a true-hearted *Englishman* have embraced the earliest Opportunity of extricating his Country out of the ruinous, expensive Perplexities he had unguardedly, if you will, involved her in?

After the Affair at *Dettingen*, when Providence visibly seem'd to have interposed in our Behalf, we found ourselves in such a Situation as might have enabled us to repair Mistakes and put an End to those Expences, which it is certain we were in no Condition to bear. But what did we then? why, the very reverse of what an *Englishman* would do, of what an *English* Minister ought to have done, and what any one but a *H———n* in *extreme* would have done. We took upon us to negociate with the *Emperor*, and when we had brought him to acquiesce to whatever we proposed, we broke with him in a Manner attended with unparalleled Indecency and Haughtiness, as if we were afraid of a good Peace and in Love with War, the Expence of which was hurrying us every Day farther and farther towards our Ruin.—But why was our Conduct so obviously repugnant to the Interest of *England*? That is the grand Question,
C which

which I see no Way of solving to any Satisfaction, but by admitting that the Negotiator at *Hanau* was an *H———n* in *extreme*.

But tho' I am unable to answer directly why our Behaviour at *Hanau* was so very extraordinary, unaccountable, and inconsistent with the political Notions of a true *Englishman*; yet one may say something negatively, and roundly assert that it was not for certain Reasons, which otherwise might be suggested in Support of our Conduct on that Occasion.

To begin then : It was not because her *Hungarian* Majesty refused her Concurrence to the Peace, for She has since, on the Faith and Honour of a crown'd Head, declared that it was not so much as *asked*. It was not from the Obstinacy of the Emperor, for he yielded all that we demanded. It was not from any Suspicion of his Sincerity, for the Terms we prescribed put that out of his Power. It was not, because upon Recollection we might think those Terms too good for him, because we have seen better given his Son, without our Interposition, and yet we approved and applauded them. It was not because the Interest of *England* was not sufficiently considered, for She had nothing to ask. It was not because the Independency of
Germany

Germany wou'd not be fecured by the Peace; because all the *Germans* that have fince fpoke or wrote on the Subject, unanimoufly agree it would. It was not because the *Dutch* would be infecure if Peace was reftored in the Empire, because they have ever maintain'd that the Tranquillity of the *Germanic* Body is their fureft and beft Security.

Many more negative Reafons might be given for our Conduct at *Hanau*; but as for affirmative Reafons, every one is at Liberty to affign fuch as pleafe him moft. Some have faid, that it was because our *Accidental* Intereft was not fufficiently confidered by the Propofals offered to and accepted by the late Emperor, and that that generous Prince would not wound his Honour fo far as to confent to certain *Secularizations* in favour of that Intereft. Certain it is, that if this be a Calumny it can't be deem'd a groundlefs Calumny, because the very *Minifter* who negotiated this Treaty, gave it *under his Hand* to the *Imperial* Ambaffador, that he firft mentioned to him fome fuch *Secularizations*, as Expedients by which the Emperor his Mafter might purchafe Peace.

The Affairs of *Germany*, I may fay of almoft all *Europe*, took a new Turn from the Rupture of this Treaty; but the Turn was

such as might have been expected, as might have been seen by a Minister who was not a *H———n* in *extreme*. After treating the Head of the Empire so ill at *Hanau*, there seemed to be just Grounds for supposing he might be treated worse; and the Apprehensions of this, united the Friends of the *German* Constitution in that which was called the Treaty of *Franckfort*. This is a Truth that can't be call'd in question, because the very Treaty itself is a Proof of it, so are the Imperial Rescripts; the *Prussian* Manifesto, the Prince of *Hess's* Memorial, and above all the present Elector of *Bavaria's* Rescript. From this new *Æra* we may date the King of *Prussia's* Defection, and the enormous Expence of the Confusions consequential of it.

Will any Man say that the Minister who brought about all this was an *Englishman*, such a true-hearted *Englishman* as had the Interest of his Country principally in his View? Will any Man say that the Minister lately deceased, taken in this Sense, was an *Englishman*? Or will any Man so far deviate from Reason and common Sense, as to suppose him an *Englishman*, if by the Epithet we mean a Lover of *England*, who wou'd advise us to engage as Principals in a Land-War, at a Time that we have an unextinguish'd Rebellion

Rebellion in our Bowels, are taxed up to the Chin, and indebted up to the Ears? Yet this is what the Author of the Work I have under my present Consideration recommends to us. Nay, he is not contented to recommend and expostulate, but bullys and frights into Condescension a People whom he knows from Experience to be the easiest frightened and scared of any in *Europe*. Certain I am he cannot be an *Englishman*, in the true Sense of the Appellation, any more than the Author of *Faction Detected*, that had lured the Nation into a *French War*, by drawing a false and deformed Portrait of *France*, and ensuring us Success, who would now deceive us under the Veil of Friendship, to exert the poor Remains of our Strength on the *Continent*, against that Power which proved too strong for us there before she had Possession of a single Village belonging to our Allies.

But if this Writer, this Mole, this Rover, be no *Englishman*, what shall we call him but a *H——n*? How shall we distinguish him from those honest *Englishmen* who are *H——ns* so far as to be Friends to the *H——r* Succession, but by deeming him, as all the World did Sir *R. Walpole*, as all the World does his Successor or Successors, a *H——n* in *extreme*? This being a Creature the most noxious that can be,

be, and the most dangerous to our Constitution, I thought it incumbent upon me to detect and expose him as far as lay in my Power, that by setting a Mark upon him as we do on some Felons, he may no longer be able to delude and impose on the over-credulous good-natured Public.

I shall consider by and by, the Arguments by which this *H——n* Mole would fright us into the Support of a War on the *Continent* with *all* our Force, at a time that we find it difficult to suppress a despicable Rebellion at Home, and are oblig'd to have Recourse to foreign Aid in order to the Suppression; in the mean while, I say, I beg Leave to quote part of a Speech of one of this Author's Patrons on this Subject, while he was at the Head of the Opposition to Sir *Robert Walpole*. And surely, what was Truth then, is so now, and will ever be so. For there is this peculiar Advantage attends *Truth*, that it is the same at all times, and that we are sure to come at it if we are earnest in the Search, and examine Things to the Bottom.

“ The Ballance of Power, says Mr. *P——y*
 “ in *January 1734-5*, in *Europe* is certainly
 “ ly of as much Consequence to other
 “ Nations as it is to this; and when it
 “ comes to be really in Danger, it is not
 “ to

“ to be questioned but that we shall find
 “ other Powers as ready to join with us,
 “ as we are to join with them for its Pre-
 “ servation : and unless we shew too much
 “ Readiness to bear all the Expence, it
 “ is also certain, that those who are in
 “ equal Danger will never refuse their
 “ proportional Share of the Expence. But
 “ if ever this Nation should put itself up
 “ as the Don *Quixote* of *Europe*, we may
 “ then expect that most of the Powers of
 “ *Europe*, who are not immediately at-
 “ tacked, will heave the whole Burthen
 “ upon us ; and this I am afraid is too
 “ much the Case at present, &c.

Need I say that every Syllable of this
 prophetic Speech, and many others of the
 same Tenour by the same Speaker, have been
 fully and literally verified while he himself
 was in Power and since. We have less
 to say to the Ballance of Power, as being
 by Nature more independent than any Na-
 tion in *Europe* ; yet, kind Heaven ! what
 an Ocean of Blood and Treasure has it
 cost us for many Years past ? What an
 Expence has the Guarding it put us to,
 ever since the Treaty at *Hanau* was con-
 tumeliously broke off ?

Supposing this *Ballance* had been in Dan-
 ger when the Queen of *Hungary* was first
 attack'd, whose Duty and whose Interest
 most

most immediately was it to secure it? 'Tis certain that We were the last People in *Europe* that would suffer by the Turn of the Scale. The *Dutch* might have suffer'd immediately, so might the Empire of *Germany*; it might have been the same with the Electors of the Empire; and the Crowns of *Sweden* and *Denmark* might have suffered, if not immediately, yet not very remotely. In short, there is not a People upon the Continent who would not have found the Calamity before it could have reached our Insular Empire. Yet we did not see one of these stir a Foot in its Defence.

What does the Patriot *P*——y say on another Occasion during his Opposition, concerning the Ballance of Power? “ For
 “ God’s Sake, Sir, (addressing himself to
 “ the Speaker) are we eternally to be the
 “ *Dupes* of *Europe*? Are we for the Sake
 “ of preserving the Ballance of Power in
 “ *Europe*, to undertake at our own Charges
 “ to defend every Power in *Europe*, and
 “ to prevent their being invaded or con-
 “ quered by any of their Neighbours?
 “ Such Arguments, Sir, I should think
 “ ridiculous if made Use of for persuad-
 “ ing us to make the least additional Ex-
 “ pence; but they are much more so
 when

menſe Debt, and innumerable Taxes, are ſolely owing to our Land Wars, to our taking it in our Heads to pull down *France*, and preſerve the Ballance of Power, unheeded, or rather laugh'd at by the reſt of *Europe*?

Let us hear Sir *Robert Walpole*, concerning this frightful *French* Boar, which, according to our preſent *H——n* Mole, we are to hunt down with *all* our Force, for fear he ſhould tread us under his Feet, after he ſhall have waſhed and cleanſed himſelf in the Dikes of *Holland*.—I revere Sir *Robert's* Memory as little as an *Engliſhman* ought, as little as I ſhould that of all *H——ns* in *Extreme*; but I cannot, in Juſtice to Truth and myſelf, paſs over in Silence a principal Maxim he had laid down to himſelf, which was, to keep his Country in Peace as long as poſſible. But though the Maxim in itſelf was good and ſalutary, yet am I far from thinking that that Miniſter adhered to it out of any Principle of Virtue; becauſe if he had, he would not have made us pay as dear for his Peace, abating a Trifle, as we could for War, of which the Non-payment of our National Debt, during his long pacific Adminiſtration, is an irrefragable Proof.

The Scheme of the C——t in Sir *Robert's* Time was Peace, as neceſſary for perfecti-
oning

oning an Infant Government; but as it grew up to Maturity, it may be thought proper to change the first System. Tho' the pacific Knight went as roundly to work, towards impoverishing in order to humble us, as was possible during a Peace, yet it might be thought that War would hurry on the Work with more Rapidity and Certainty. Sir *Robert*, tho' pursuing the pacific System, was no less a *H——n* in *Extreme*, than his Successor, whose Scheme was War, Bustles, and Confusion.—But to return to Sir *Robert*, whose Words, at this Time, deserve the deepest Attention, tho' spoken on another Occasion, and some Years ago.

“ I remember, when I was a young Man,
 “ nothing gave a greater Pleasure than
 “ voting for a War with *France*; I thought
 “ it founded well, that it was heroic, and
 “ for the Glory of my Country. But, Sir,
 “ how fatal in some respects have the Con-
 “ sequences of that War, just and necessary
 “ as it was, been to *Britain*? I little
 “ dreamt that at this Day we should, by
 “ means of that War, be groaning under
 “ such a Load of Debts. I little dreamt,
 “ Sir, that the noble Resolution the Par-
 “ liament then made was to cost us so dear,
 “ or that we were to purchase our Glory
 “ at an Expence, which, after so many
 D 2 “ Years,

“ Years, would render it extremely inconvenient for us to enter into the most necessary War.”

Here was set forth the fatal Consequences of our vague Thirst of running down *France* in order to preserve the Ballance of Power. Here was a concise, but resembling Portrait of our Condition at that Time, representing “ it extremely inconvenient for “ us to enter into the most necessary War.” But what would that once powerful Minister say, was he living now, of the Madnets of becoming Principals in a Land-War against that Crown? When our Taxes are multiply'd, our Debts increased from about 46 Millions, they were when he spoke that Speech, to very near *seventy*, which they will be at the End of this Year? Would he advise a general Land-War, after the ill Success of the last Campaign, when most of our Veterans are gone, and we have not an Officer, except the Duke, who is too young to be consummate in the Art of War, of Reputation enough to command a Brigade? But whatever Sir *Robert*, who was no Doubt, a *H——n* in the *Extreme*, might think and advise at this critical Conjunction, was he living, I am convinc'd no *Englishman* untinged with *H——anism*, would wish, much less advise the Involving his Country
in

in her present Circumstances, in the obvious Calamities of a Land-War. — But let us follow our Author, and hear his Reasons for our covering the Continent with our Armies.

“ * ’Tis Trade which builds the Bridge,
 “ as it were, cross the narrow Seas, which
 “ firmly connects this Island with the Con-
 “ tinent, and makes it absolutely necessary
 “ for us to concern ourselves with the Af-
 “ fairs of our Neighbours; of those Nati-
 “ ons more especially with whom we traf-
 “ fic, and from whose various Wants we
 “ draw those sure Returns of Wealth,
 “ which both support our Credit abroad,
 “ and are the best Security of our own in-
 “ ternal Peace and Happiness.

Here we find some Truth and much Falshood, and it is on the latter the Author builds his Hypothesis. There is no doubt, that the Connection between our Island, and not only the adjoining Continent, but the whole World, had its Rise, still does, and must always subsist by Trade. But it certainly does not follow hence, as he insists here, “ that it is absolutely necessary for us to concern ourselves with the Affairs of our Neighbours.” — Here again may be a Fallacy intended about the Word *Concern*, and I apprehend this ambiguous Word was introduced purposely to

mislead the Reader, a Practice very much in use among the Writers for Ministers, who adapt obscure, ambiguous and smooth Phrases and Words, the better to colour the weak or wicked Designs of their Employers.

If by *concerning* ourselves with the Affairs of our Neighbours, he means no more than our remonstrating civilly against Innovations in such Matters of Commerce as may affect us, or more warmly where such Innovations shall be in direct Violation of Treaties: If, again, he intends only that we should endeavour to compose Differences between Powers with whom we have a commercial Intercourse, without shewing the least Partiality, by which we might endanger the weakening the Friendship for us of either Party. If, I say, this Writer means no more, by the *Concern* which he thinks of absolute Necessity, but Caution, Circumspection, and good Offices, I agree that it should be extended, not only to our Neighbours, but to the Inhabitants of the whole Globe.

But if he means, as the whole Scope of his Writings shews he does, that our *Concern* with the Affairs of the Continent requires we should thrust our Noses into all their Affairs, set them together by the Ears, fight their Quarrels, alternately take
 one

one Power by the Hand at one Time, drop him to take up another ; if he intends by *concerning* ourselves with the Affairs of our Neighbours, that we should circumscribe their Power, draw new Charts of their Territories which we shall oblige them to observe, cajole and bully them in their Turns, till we have made them all our Enemies, either open or secret : If, in short, the *Concern* he recommends as of absolute Necessity, be such as our Ministers have shewn for many Years past, I say and insist, that such *Concern* is so far from being of Necessity, that it is absolutely destructive of our Trade and Happiness.

I should be glad to know how the Trade of this Nation can be affected by Quarrels among the *Grisons* or the *Swiss* Cantons ; or, to come nearer Home, among the Members of the *Germanic* Body. Shall we vend less of our coarse Woollen Manufactures to the Inhabitants of *Siletia*? will they smoke less of our Tobacco, or consume less of our Sugar now they are Subjects to *Prussia*, than when they bore the *Austrian* Yoke? How does it, or can it ever be a *Concern* of ours in respect to our Commerce, whether *Bohemia* own the Sovereignty of the Queen of *Hungary*, or Elector of *Bavaria*? But that which is of no kind of Concern or Import to *England*,
may

may not be so to *Hanover*; and therefore we are to construe the *Concern* so strenuously recommended by this Author, to be relative to the cherish'd Electorate only.—How happy was *England*, when her Ministers scarce knew where to look for a certain paltry Dukedom in the Map of *Germany*! —But to go back to our Author, who certainly is better versed in the Affections of *Hanoverians* and Interest of *Hanover* than the Trade of *England*.

“ * I lay it down therefore as a self-evident Maxim, that the Prosperity of our National Trade depends intirely upon our foreign Customs, and the Quickness of our Commercial Returns with other Countries; and consequently, that whatever tends to deprive us of this Custom, or to exclude us from the necessary Markets wherein to dispose of our Commodities, so far ruins our Trade, dries up that surest Fountain of our Wealth, and destroys our Influence and Power abroad.” — ’Tis a Misfortune, that Writers who take upon them to inform the Public, should be totally ignorant of the Subjects they treat of. ’Tis an Insult upon the Public, to be tutor’d and catechiz’d by one who is ignorant of the first Rudiments of the Art or Science he presumes to inculcate.

The latter Part of our Author's Proposition is not to be controverted, it being no less obvious to every common Understanding than true in Fact " that the Prosperity of our National Trade depends, not intirely, as he says, but partly on the Quickness of our Commercial Returns from other Countries." But why the Prosperity of our Trade should depend upon our *Foreign Customs*, I cannot comprehend. If he means the *Customs* arising from *Importations*, as he must or mean nothing, he certainly is a Novice in Trade, and knows not its first Principles. An Increase of the *Customs* would be an Increase of the Revenue, which I may suppose the Author had his Eye upon, as all Courtiers have; but how an Augmentation of the Revenue by an Importation of Superfluities and an Increase of Luxury, can be of Benefit to a Nation, is past all Comprehension.

Suppose for Instance, that the Crown receives a Million extraordinary this or any other Year by an Increase of Duties, that is of *Foreign Customs*, on the Importation of *French* and other Wines and Brandies, or other superfluous Articles of our Home Consumption; Will it be inferred from such an Increase, that our National Trade is increas'd or meliorated? No Commercial Transaction is of real Benefit to a Nation which does not in its Consequences contribute

bute to the Increase of the National Stock of Riches. But the drinking of one or ten Thousand Tons of Foreign Liquors, far from contributing to such an Increase, evidently lessens the general Stock, by lessening the Consumption of our native Products. It is therefore clear, that *foreign Customs* can never contribute to the Prosperity of our National Trade.

Perhaps this all-knowing Gentleman won't believe that our Trade would thrive better without than with *foreign Customs*. He may not believe neither that the present Decay of our Trade is partly owing to those very *Customs* on which he says the Prosperity of our Trade depends. But whether or no he will be able to comprehend these Truths, or take the Pains to be informed, there is nothing clearer than that all Impediments to and Clogs upon Trade must be injurious to it. Nothing more evident than that the Clogs which have been brought upon our Trade by means of our Land-Wars, have reduced it to its present Ebb. Let him consult the Adventurer, who is the most nearly concern'd. What will his Answer be? Why, that he is obliged, by the extravagant Increase of the *Customs*, to have one Capital more than he need if the Customs had been moderate; by which means he is obliged to contract his Commerce, and trade for no more

more than just half what he would if there had been no such enormous Clog upon him.

To render this familiar to those who may not have turn'd their Application to this sort of Study; suppose a Merchant imports as much Wine or other Commodity which pays high Duties, as cost him a thousand Pounds abroad; he must pay another thousand at least before he can get Possession of his own Goods, or have it in his power to vend them. Here then evidently is a second Capital he is forced to keep by him as a dead Stock, which otherwise might be imploy'd in the Enlargement of his Trade. Thus then are *Foreign Customs* so far from promoting, or being of aid to Trade, according to our sagacious Author, that they obstruct that *Quickness of Commercial Returns*, on which, he says, the Prosperity of our National Trade depends.

As our Author meddles with that which he does not understand, 'tis no wonder he builds all along upon false Principles. But in this he may be excuseable in some measure, even supposing he was more Master of his Subject; because no other Principles would intitle him to the Thanks of his Patrons, as no other would answer their Designs and Purposes. These *H——ns* in *Extreme* want to plunge this Country, (I can't call it their Country, because they treat it unnaturally) into a Land-War, for Purposes relative to *Hanover*, and

H———*ns* only; but that it may be relish'd or borne with common Patience by a bleeding Nation, they must be alarmed with the total Loss of their Trade, unless they support this ruinous Land-War with *all* their Strength and Attention. Here lies the whole Secret of this pompous Declaration, setting forth the deplorable State of Trade, should *France* become Mistress of the best Part of *Europe*. In his next Edition, I expect he will make her a Present of the Whole.

Immediately after he had laid it down as a *self-evident Maxim*, tho' none ever was or can be less so, "that the Prosperity of
 " our National Trade depends entirely
 " upon our *Foreign Customs, &c.*" he proceeds in the following manner. † "Sup-
 " pose then, in the first place, that the
 " Sea-Coasts of *Holland, Flanders, Portugal,*
 " *Genoa and Tuscany*, were in the Hands
 " of our Enemies, what would be the
 " undoubted Consequences of such an
 " Event in regard to this Nation? The
 " Supposition is at least possible, and there-
 " fore there can be no Absurdity in arguing
 " from it."—Tho' it may not be absurd to argue from mere Possibilities, yet it seldom is done but to cover some Iniquity, or to colour some mischievous Design, which it is not safe to avow openly. I never knew any Writers, but such as are sent out as the forlorn-Hope, or Picquets of

a Minister, to be Dealers in Possibilities. They are standing Commodities which the Fallacious and Deceitful, whose Business is to build not where there is a solid Foundation, but wherever the Situation will answer their dark Purposes best. The Author goes on. " We will, secondly, examine what Probability there may be, that thus it will really happen, that these Coasts will actually fall into the Hands of our Enemies, upon Supposition of the Neutrality of *England* with respect to the Continent ; or, what comes to much the same Thing, upon Supposition that *England* acts only with its Fleet, and its Negotiations, in Defence of its Allies on the Continent."

The first Part of this Supposition is founded on a Possibility that *France* may be Arbitress of the World, and the second on a Probability that she will, unless *England* will oppose her on the Continent with all her Force. As to the former, every thing that is possible may happen. It being possible that an *English* Ministry may be honest and uncorrupt, even under Princes possessing foreign Dominions, it may so happen that they might once consult the Interest of their own Country before that of any other. *France* indeed may be Mistress not only of *Holland* but of *Europe*, and even of the whole World ; but sure I am, that there is but little Probability that she will

will so much as attempt to conquer *Holland*, much less be able to compass the Acquisition of a Province, which *France* knows by dear-bought Experience to be no easy Conquest.

Let us hear what a *Hollander* says on this Subject, and surely he may be allowed to know his Danger best and see it soonest.

“ * It was to no Purpose the attempting
 “ to engage the Republic in a War for the
 “ Support of the Ballance, because the
 “ Ballance with respect to the Republic,
 “ thro’ the present Situation of Affairs, is
 “ mounted to its highest Period, at least
 “ humanely speaking ; for the two neigh-
 “ bouring Powers, most capable of giving
 “ Umbrage to the State, *viz. France* and
 “ *Prussia*, have an equal Interest in hinder-
 “ ing the Growth of each other’s Force.
 “ Besides, they would least of all permit
 “ this at the Expence of a State, which
 “ serves as a common Barrier between
 “ them both ; from whence it may be
 “ concluded, that the Republic ought to
 “ lay the greatest Strefs on the Friendship
 “ of two Powers, whose Interest obliged
 “ them to live in perfect Harmony with
 “ her. To this may be added, that this
 “ good Intelligence was the sole Counter-
 “ poise that could preserve the Ballance of
 “ free Navigation, and of Commerce. But
 “ it may be asked, what shall the Repub-
 “ lic

* Van Hoey’s *Letters*, pag. 18 and 19.

“ lic do in case *France* and *Prussia* should
 “ agree to render themselves her Masters?
 “ To which it was answered, first, by asking
 “ what would the Republic do, if *France*
 “ and the House of *Austria* should form
 “ such a Design? and secondly, by the
 “ evident and strong Probability there was
 “ that no such Thing should ever come
 “ about, on account of the Difference of
 “ Religions profess’d by the Kings of *France*
 “ and *Prussia*. For both Potentates pro-
 “ fessing a Zeal for the Extention of their
 “ different Faiths, this alone is sufficient
 “ to hinder them from entering into any
 “ close Engagements, and especially from
 “ concerting together such unnatural and
 “ pernicious Enterprizes.

Here is a Key that unlocks at one View
 all the Quibbles and Subtilties of Ministerial
 Declaimers in Favour of a Land-War.
Prussia may be glad to see the House of
Austria so reduced as to be unable to wrest
Siletia from him, or to give the Law in
Germany hereafter as formerly, and there-
 fore looks on while *France* weakens her in
 the *Netherlands*. But *Prussia* will never
 permit *France* to keep all her Conquests
 there, most of which she must give up on
 a Peace; much less would his *Prussian* Ma-
 jesty allow any Conquests to be made of
 the Territories of the Republic. The Dif-
 ference of Interest and Religions of the
 Kings of *France* and *Prussia* must be a cer-
 tain

tain Security to the States General ; nor will it be less so in the Preservation of the Ballance of Power, which has so long filled the wise Heads of *Englishmen*. I won't take upon me to say, what the King of *Prussia* may think or do in regard to the Guardianship of *Hanover* ; but as the Fate of that Dukedom, be it what it will, could not affect either the Liberty or Trade of old *England*, I can't see that *Englishmen* could justify the entering into a ruinous Land-War in order to aggrandize or even preserve it.

We have arraign'd the *Dutch*, and most wrongfully, of being too passive and supine since the breaking out of the present War. But whoever will only consider the Certainty they always had of being safe as long as the King of *Prussia* should be powerful, and the infinite commercial Benefits they reaped by our being deprived of the lucrative Trade of *Spain*, will absolve that wise People from either Neglect or Imprudence. They had the Experience of above half a Century to guide them. They had been hunting along with us for the Ballance of Power till they beggar'd themselves, lost their Trade, and got into a Debt they never can pay ; and after the tedious, expensive Chace they find at last that they might have sat still all the while, because the Ballance of Power will always take care of itself. It must always subsist, because
it

it must ever be the Interest of all Powers to preserve it. It may seem, for a while, to incline more to one Side than another; but it will soon recover and poize itself again. It may appear to bend towards *France* at present; but *Prussia* particularly, and all *Germany*, will never permit that it should continue long in its present, or any other Position that may affect the public Safety and Freedom. Nay, the Powers of the North would rise up in Defence of Liberty. There is no doubt that *Russia*, *Poland*, *Sweden*, and *Denmark* will always take care that the Beam of Power be rightly poized. A bare Attempt to conquer *Holland* would rouse these Powers to join in such a Confederacy against *France* as might shake her very Foundations. This she knows, and this she will avoid, whether *England* involve herself or not in a Land-war in order to promote some favourite foreign Interest.

Let us not then be more solicitous for the *Dutch* than they are for themselves. We may hurt them, but are sure the embarking them in an expensive War can never better their Condition. A too refin'd Policy may be no less dangerous in Temporals than Over-righteousness in Spirituals. " Let " not our Policy be of a Piece with that of " the Astrologer, (to have recourse, once " more, to the wise *Dutchman* I just quoted,) who while he pretended to dis-
F " cover

“ cover future Events by gazing at the
 “ Stars, saw so little what was at his Foot
 “ as to fall into a Pit.” Would not this
 be our Case should we plunge ourselves in
 an Expence we are in no Condition to bear,
 in order to ward off a very distant, if not an
 imaginary Evil? Shall we not fall into the
 Pit at our Foot, one of our own digging too,
 which would be no small Aggravation, if
 to preserve our Trade we ruin it, and if to
 preserve Liberty, we surrender it to our
 worst, that is, our secret Enemies? Who
 is so blind as not to see that such will be,
 must be the Consequences of our taking up
 a Burthen we are as incapable of supporting
 as our *H—ns* in the *Extreme* are of pur-
 suing the true Interest of *England*?

But let us examine our Author upon his
 own Principles, vague and untenable as
 most of them are. “ All our Power, says
 “ he, flows from our Wealth, and our
 “ Wealth from Trade; therefore whatever
 “ obstructs our Trade, impairs our Wealth
 “ and Power.”—All this is undoubtedly
 true; but what follows is far from being
 equally so. “ If *England* does not imme-
 “ diately exert all her Strength upon the
 “ Continent in Opposition to *France*, she
 “ will lose all her Trade, because *France*,
 “ or which is the same, the House of *Bour-*
 “ *bon*, will be Mistress of all the Sea-Coasts
 “ from *Turky* to *Denmark*.”

In the first place, I deny that *England* would lose her present Trade to those Coasts, which the Author would persuade us *France* will be soon in Possession of, unless we involve ourselves in a War on the Continent, even supposing the Branch of the House of *Bourbon* in *France* should conquer *Holland*, and that in *Spain* should overrun *Portugal*. In order to prove this, which will be a Proof of all other Propositions of this Nature, it will be necessary we consider and examine the Nature of Trade in general.

Trade is two-fold, foreign and domestic. Foreign Trade, which is that under Consideration at present, consists of carrying to foreign Markets the Products, manufactured or otherwise, of one's own Country, and bringing back the Products of other Regions in return. When these Returns are made in Bullion, Bills of Exchange, or in Articles which may be manufactured or meliorated so as to be fitted for the Use of foreign Nations, then is the Ballance on the Side of the Country so trading to Advantage. But be it observed, that no Country will send out but its Superfluities only. People will no more part with Necessaries, than they will be without them if they can purchase them. Therefore, had we more Worlds than this to trade to, we should send no more Commodities abroad than we could spare from

our own Use; and, let who will be the Possessors, all the Countries of *Europe* must take from us such Necessaries as they want, and can't have so good and cheap from other Nations.

For instance, all who want our Lead, Tin, our Woollen Manufactures, and various other Articles which no other Nation can furnish so good and cheap, will have them because we can or ought to afford them cheaper than others. The Buyer will always seek Pennyworths; and if our Trade be decayed, 'tis not for want of Markets, but because our Taxes and Luxury prevent our working as cheap, and affording such Pennyworths to foreign Nations as formerly, or indeed as some other more industrious less burthen'd and more frugal People than we can do. Let who will therefore be Masters of *Italy*, the Inhabitants will take off our Hands what they want of our Commodities, and will most willingly sell to us such of theirs as we want and they can spare. Was not this the Case all over the extended Coast of *Spain* before the present War, tho' the Prince there be of the House of *Bourbon*? Was it not the same in *Naples* and *Sicily*? is it not the same there even at this time, tho' the King be of the House of *Bourbon*, and that we are at War with his Father and the elder Branch of his Family?

We

We should have the same Access to, the same Trade with *Portugal*, should that Country exchange the House of *Brangaza* for that of *Bourbon*. The same may be said in respect to *Holland*, whether independent or tributary to *France*, unless a more industrious parsimonious People be transplanted thither, or unless it can be supposed that *France* can furnish all Nations with what they want. But let me repeat it again: All Nations but our own, are frugal and buy as cheap as they can; they will deal with those who afford the best Bargains; therefore unless the Clogs upon our Trade and Manufacturers prevent us, all the Nations of the Earth will deal with us for what they want in our Way. In short, Conveniency will be ever regarded in Trade, and whenever it ceases, there is an End of that Intercourse created by Trade.

What is the Reason we had little or no Trade with *France* before this War? Because they want very little of our Commodities for their Necessities. And had we been wise, we should have taken nothing from them, because they have nothing which we absolutely want, nothing which we may not very well do without. But the *French*, all along and even now, took off several of our Commodities, such as Lead, Tin, Coals, Tobacco, Allum, Copperas, &c. This was the Effect of Necessity, and Necessity will ever have the like Effect. Therefore,

fore, as I said before, if we want Trade, 'tis because of the Weight of Taxes which oppresses it, and not for want of Markets. To pretend then the engaging in a Land-War for the Security of our Trade, is such an Imposition as none but a Courtier would offer; 'tis such as no People would bear but we infatuated *Englishmen*, who are to be frighten'd by every Scare-crow thrown in our Way by designing Men.

The *French* are now in Possession of the Ports of the *Austrian Netherlands*; but upon a Peace, there is no doubt that they will part with them and all or most of their late Conquests, because *Prussia* will think it proper, and because that and other Powers will not suffer *France* to keep all she may be inclin'd to. But supposing the *Netherlands* remain'd with *France*, how shall that affect the Trade of *England*? In our Trade with the *Austrian Netherlands* ever since the Peace of *Utrecht*, the Balance has been against us greatly; and the Reason was, that we took off more in Value of their Lace, Cambricks, Lawns and Linens, than they wanted of our Products, because the *Flemmings* are as frugal and industrious, as we are luxurious and extravagant. Let who will have the *Netherlands*, we shall always import thither as much of our Products as will be wanted there: and if our Duke *William* were in Possession of them we should do no more. We are sure the
 Royal

Royal Possessor of the Dukedom of *Hanover* is a Friend to, nay the Father of *England*, yet what Trade has *England* with *Hanover*? Why, none, or as good as none; because the *Hanoverians* are too wise not to be contented with their own Products: And what they want besides, they take from *Holland*, because they can sell cheaper than *England*. I am sure *England* has no visible Trade with *Hanover*; but I won't answer that a private Commerce is not carried on far more injurious to us than even our Trade with *France* for Wines and Gewgaws. But be that as it will, to return to the Subject of Trade, 'tis clear that the Conquest of the *Netherlands*, with regard to Trade, wou'd not affect this Nation. Our general Commerce would still go on, we should supply Wants where they were; and where there were none, there never can be any Call for our Products and Manufactures.

Perhaps our omniscient Author won't believe it, tho' it be true, that we imported more of our Woollen Manufactures to *Dunkirk* alone, for many Years before the breaking out of the present War, than to all the *Austrian Netherlands*. The Reason was this; The *Flemmings* having various Kinds of Woollen Manufactures of their own, they did not want so much of ours as the *French*, who have few: And as *Dunkirk* is a free Port, the *French* smuggled
our

our Manufactures from thence far and near into the Country.

This is a farther Proof that Trade subsists by Want and Necessity. What we abound with is wanting to other Nations; and what they abound with may be convenient for us. But let it be observed, that tho' I make use of the Word *Want* in the General, I am far from thinking that all *Wants* are equal. Luxury has created a thousand *Wants* that are not of Necessity; and sorry I am, that we have more of these than any Nation in *Europe*, which is one Reason that we can't relieve the *Wants* of other Nations as cheap as some others. But our excessive Luxury is not the only Clog upon our Industry. The Weight of our Taxes hangs heavier upon it. Yet by the Scheme of our Author, this Weight is not only to be continued but increased.—Are we not superlatively happy in our Ministerial Schemists, who thus continue to hurry us from one Extreme to another, to drive us from one bad Measure to worse, till we are tame enough to bear whatever Yoke they shall be pleased to impose upon us?

“ But oh! says this *H——n* in the *Extreme*, your Trade is lost, your Liberty
 “ and the Ballance of Power, if you don't
 “ now exert all your Force to curb *France*.
 “ 'Tis not enough to stop her Carreer,
 “ she must be humbled, and it must be
 “ done

Troops, and answer other Purposes of the Government for three Years past, that there was not enough left to circulate our Paper Credit. Yet you advise us to a fresh Expence, which would drain us of every Guinea we have left. — Strange Policy ! but our Author's Notions of Politics and Trade are pretty equal. To hear him dilate on the Ballance of Power, one would think him, as no doubt he thinks himself, to be a *Machiavel* ; and to see how he runs over and examines all the several Branches of our Commerce, you would swear he deserved a Statue more than Sir *John*. — Hear him about our Trade to *Turky*, which he doubts to be advantageous to this Nation. “ * For if it be made a Question, “ even in our present Situation, whether “ the *Turky Trade*, for instance, be of any “ very great Advantage to the Nation, “ whether the Ballance of our Returns “ from that Country be much in our Fa- “ vour ; surely the Matter will be put “ quite out of all doubt, when the additio- “ nal Delays, and Expence of Convoys, “ Insuranc, &c. be taken into the Ac- “ count ; when the continual Risques of “ *Neapolitan, Italian, Spanish, and French* “ Privateers are computed, when exposed “ to Winds and Tempests there are no

* Page 7.

“ friendly

“ friendly Harbours left for our Ships to
 “ put into, throughout the whole Navi-
 “ gation, but *Makon* and *Gibraltar*.”

We will overlook this Writer's distinguishing between *Neapolitan* and *Italian* Privateers, these Sort of trifling Slips being below the Attention of great Wits; but methinks he might have remember'd that there was such a Part of the Globe as *Africk*. He assures us, that our *Turky* trading Ships have not a friendly Harbour to stop a Tide at between *Turky* and *England* but *Makon* and *Gibraltar*, tho' it be certain that they come all along the *African* Coast, and that we are at Peace with all the Powers on that extended Coast.

But what Coherency can be expected from a Pen that doubts the Advantages of our *Turky* Trade, and builds upon a Basis of his own creating, *viz.* that we are for ever to be at War with *France*, and the whole House of *Bourbon*, unless we pull them down immediately? 'Tis impossible for a Trade to be attended with more visible Advantages than ours to *Turky*, because we send out but our own Products and Manufactures, and bring Home in return, chiefly such Products of that Country as admit of Melioration, or are of Necessity in our Manufactures. Our Misfortune is not that the *Turky* Trade is bad in its

own Nature, but that we have little of it, in respect of what we had before our Wars with *France*. By endeavouring to beat the *French*, they beat us out of our *Turkey* Trade, and some others; that is, we clogged our Trade so by Taxes and other Impediments to support these Wars, that the *French* have been able to under-sell us at the Markets in the *Levant*.

No less extraordinary is the Author's Supposition of our living in a continual State of War with *France*. And yet on this Supposition, chimerical, or rather absurd as it is, he founds all his Reasoning. "Our Trade, says he, must be ruined, because *France* will shut us out of all the Ports from *Turkey* to the *Baltick*; and this must continue so for ever." All his pompous Declamation about Trade rolls upon this Supposition, than which nothing can be more false and ridiculous. The next Supposition he builds upon is, the Overthrow of the Ballance of Power. I hope I have explained the Nature of Trade in such a manner as to leave no doubt that we need not, at this time, employ *all* our Strength against *France* on the Continent in order to preserve it: and in order to strengthen what I have already said concerning the Ballance of Power, I shall subjoin what has been said many Years ago on the

the Subject, by the very first Genius, for Politics, not only of this Nation, but, I verily believe, of all *Europe*.

* “ Whenever the Ballance of Power is
 “ in real Danger by the exorbitant Growth
 “ of one Power, or by the Union of more,
 “ other Princes and States will be alarm’d
 “ of Course. All of them ought, and most
 “ of them will take Measures for their
 “ common Security. But the *wise Councils*
 “ amongst them will, upon every such Oc-
 “ casion, proportion their Measures, and
 “ the Engagements they enter into, not
 “ according to the Danger, *considered gene-*
 “ *rally*, but according to the *immediate* or
 “ *remote* Relation which it has to *each* of
 “ them, and according to the *Strength*,
 “ *Situation*, or any other Circumstance
 “ which may be peculiar to each of
 “ them.

“ To do otherwise would be to lose
 “ Sight of our *particular Interest* in the
 “ Pursuit of a *common Interest*. It would
 “ be nothing better than setting up for the
 “ *Don Quixots* of the World, and engaging
 “ to fight the Battles of Mankind. The
 “ State which keeps its *own particular Inte-*
 “ *rest* constantly in View, has an invariable
 “ Rule to go by ; and this will direct and
 “ limit all its Proceedings in foreign Affairs :

* *Occasional Writer*, No. II. Pag. 33, 34.

“ So

“ So that such a State will frequently take
 “ *no* Share, and frequently a *small* Share in
 “ the Disputes of its Neighbours, and will
 “ never exert its *whole* Strength but when
 “ its *whole* is at stake. But a State who
 “ neglects to do this has no Rule at all to
 “ go by, and must fight to negotiate, and
 “ negotiate to fight again, so long as it is a
 “ State; because as long as it is a State
 “ there will be Disputes among its Neigh-
 “ bours, and some of these will prevail at
 “ at one time, and some at another, in the
 “ perpetual Flux and Reflux of human Af-
 “ fairs.”

In order to see the Imprudence of our Conduct for a Series of Years past, we need only view it in this Mirror of Truth and sound Politics. In order to see that to which we are invited by our Querist, we have but to examine it by the salutary Maxims laid down by the aforesaid judicious Pen. “ A
 “ wise State will never exert its *whole*
 “ Strength but where its *whole* is at stake.”--
 How widely does our puny Author deviate from this great Writer! * “ If then we will
 “ save *Europe*, if indeed we will save
 “ *England* as a free, trading, and Protec-
 “ tant Country, whatever may be the Con-
 “ sequence, we must act with our *whole*

“ Force, both by Sea and *Land*, both in
 “ *Europe* and *America*.”

Nothing will do, it seems, with this Politician, but our *whole* Force ; and why should we expect, that he who assures us the *whole* is at stake, would be contented with less? Nay, 'tis not our *whole* only which is in Jeopardy, but the *whole* of all *Europe*.—

“ If then we will save *Europe* ” — Why shan't we let other Powers come in with us for a Share of the Honour of saving *Europe*? The sound occasional Writer above quoted, assures us, that all Powers will look to their own Security when there is real Danger ; and common Reason suggests as much.—“ Well, “ but our own *whole* is struck at, our Liberty, “ our Trade, and Religion.” Sad indeed ! The *French* are to import two Armies here, one of Soldiers to beat us out of our Freedom, the other of Mendicants to preach us out of our Religion ; and this is not all neither, but we lose our Trade ; that is, we must be Beggars as well as Slaves and Papists.—Frightful Reflexion!

I can't say, however, but there is some room to hope, that *France*, was she willing, would not be able even should she keep all her late Conquests, to render us as miserable as this chimerical Author pretends to dread. I say *pretends*, because I am sure he himself does not believe a Syllable of what he would persuade

persuade the credulous *English* Nation to believe. What a dismal Picture does he draw of us, when the *French* shall cover the Ocean with her Fleets! I suppose he means riding at Anchor all over the Salt Water, as a late Searcher for the Longitude would have his Bomb-Ketches to be. Yet we have lately seen this same formidable *France* unable to send a single Man to the Rebels in *Scotland*, but what she stole in by the Neglect of our Seamen. She frighten'd us indeed with Embarkations, when no other People but we would be frighten'd; but at the same time shew'd her Impotence.

“ When * we shall see a superior Fleet
 “ riding in our Channel, commanding the
 “ narrow Seas, and menacing our trembling
 “ Shores on every Side; when every Breath
 “ of Wind from the *East* shall put us into a
 “ Panic, for every thing that is dear and
 “ valuable.”—— Surely the Panic of last
 Winter dwells still upon the Mind of this
 trembling Writer! Alas! what is to be-
 come of us now? For it is not only the
South, but the *East* Wind our Shores are to
 tremble at; which plainly shews that *France*
 intends to extend her Conquests as far as the
Sound at least. But to be more serious, why
 are we thus frighten'd with imaginary Fleets,
 Fleets in the Clouds? Surely, there must be

* Page 15.

some Snake in the Grass which the Public does not see, or this Author would have been examined before I took him in hand. I confess, I think I see it, and therefore think myself obliged to give my Country fair Warning of the latent Mischief designed.

Our *H--ns* in the *Extreme* don't think we are humble enough; but a Land-War carried on with *all* our Force, will soon reduce us to such a State of Humility as they may require. Should the War on the Continent be discontinued by *England*, the *Hanoverian* Troops must remain a dead Weight on the Electorate; besides, 'tis but in Times of Confusion that Chance may throw some Opportunity in the way of enlarging the narrow Bounds of certain cherish'd, hereditary Dominions. Add to these Considerations, that by drawing the *Ha---n* Troops once again into the *Netherlands*, they will be a Step nearer being brought over to replace so many *English* Troops, as may be thought proper to waft over to the Continent for the Glory of the Nation.—How would it tarnish the Glory of *England*, how would it sully her Fame, if none of her Sons were to share the Glory of saving *Europe*? —These are not all neither; but they are all, and enough too, I should think, to set an *Englishman* upon his Guard,

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that

that I care to make public at present. I don't doubt but every intelligent Reader will form to himself many more Motives than I have mentioned, for the extraordinary Zeal which appears all of a sudden in those who would alarm us into a Land-War with *all* our Force. Nor do I question but such Steps will be taken soon after I lay down my Pen, 'perhaps before I let it fall, as will convince the Public of the Necessity of that Unanimity which I here endeavour to create, and which alone can preserve us from an Attempt that probably will prove our Ruin, should we make it. I am not afraid to say, that, if according to this Writer's Advice, we embark in a Land-War with the little *All* of the Force we have left, we shall be inevitably ruin'd; we shall be brought as low as our secret Enemies would wish us; we shall be as humble and supple as the most zealous *Ha—n* in the *Extreme* would have us to be.

To conclude; if there be no such latent, dangerous Views in urging the Nation to the Prosecution of a Land-War with *all* our Force, and that it is only calculated for reducing *France*, because that ambitious Crown has always Views to our Prejudice, there is a far surer Way of compassing the glorious Design, and putting ourselves in a Posture of bidding her Defiance, than by
launch-

launching out with *all* our Force at once against her where she is least vulnerable.

The most natural and the most effectual Method of securing ourselves and others against that Crown, must be by adding to the real and internal Strength of this Nation, which can be no otherwise affected than by pursuing such Measures as may unite us at home, and secure to the Government the Hearts of the whole People. But will it be said, or can it be supposed, that a People clogg'd, oppress'd, and beggar'd as we are by maintaining Wars upon the *Continent*, will heartily *unite* in the Prosecution of a Measure which has already brought them to the very Brink of Ruin? It may be, and no doubt it is, the Interest of particular Men to confound and involve a Country; but it can never be that of the Bulk of a People to undertake a Species of War, which if successful, they can never benefit by; and if unsuccessful, will probably be attended with inevitable Destruction.

Some sanguine Men, like the Author who forced the Pen into my Hand, may arraign me of Defection for thus warning my Countrymen against carrying on a War in a manner the most injurious to them; but I doubt not that the Resentment of such, when they cool, will turn to Thankfulness,

fulness, like that of a Man recovered from a high Fever, who owns gratefully the good Office of keeping him from breaking his Neck out of a Window in the height of his Distemper.

Upon the whole ; a War upon the *Continent* is not the Business of an Insular Trading People at any time, much less when it is manifest they are unable to support it. If this be a resembling Picture of our Condition at present, and if it may be extended, what shall we think of those who, being Authors of our present Broils and Confusions, yet would involve us in all the Calamities of such a ruinous War, under the specious Pretext of obtaining for us Security and Peace? Such Men are thus described by *Grotius*.

“ Let us hear those Men discourse, who
 “ preach up the Necessity of War ; it is
 “ only, according to their Doctrine, the
 “ more effectually to secure our Peace.
 “ But if they were really peaceably inclined,
 “ they would never break it, because it
 “ depends only upon them to preserve it.”

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